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ABSTRACT
This paper briefly describes the spacecraft and ground systems
monitoring process at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and highlights some
difficulties associated with the existing technology used in mission
operations. A new automated system based on artificial intelligence
technology is described which seeks to overcome many of these
limitations. The system, called the Spacecraft Health Automated
Reasoning Prototype (SHARP), is designed to automate health and status
analysis for multi-mission spacecraft and ground data systems
operations. The SHARP system has proved to be effective for detecting
and analyzing potential spacecraft and ground systems problems by
performing real-time analysis of spacecraft and ground data systems
engineering telemetry. Telecommunications link analysis of the Voyager 2
spacecraft was the initial focus for evaluation of the system in a real-
time operations setting during the Voyager spacecraft encounter with
Neptune in August, 1989. The SHARP system will be delivered to the JPL
Space Flight Operations Center for regular use by planetary flight
projects, including the Galileo and Magellan spacecraft, and will also be
applied to monitoring and control applications in the Deep Space Network's
Network Operations Control Center.
2. INTRODUCTION
The Voyager 1 and Voyager 2 spacecraft were launched from Cape
Canaveral, Florida, on August 20, 1977. The technology to monitor the
health and status of these probes was designed and developed in the early
1970's. This now-antiquated technology, coupled with the heroic efforts
of many JPL personnel over the last 13 years, has carried Voyager 2
This paper was previously presented at SPIE, Orlando, Florida, April, 1990.
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through near-fatal catastrophic events to four of our solar systems outer
planets. Despite the spacecraft's failed radio receiver, sunlight damage to
the photopolarimeter scientific instrument, and partially paralyzed scan
platform (which houses Voyager's imaging system), JPL engineers have
kept Voyager operational, enabling the capture and transmission of vast
amounts of invaluable information and images of the Jovian, Saturnian,
Uranian, and Neptunian systems.
During critical periods of the mission, up to 40 real-time operators are
required to monitor the spacecraft's 10 subsystems on a 24-hour, 7-day-
per-week schedule. This does not include the numerous subsystem and
scientific instrument specialists who must constantly be available on call
to handle emergencies. Unlike the 1980's, when JPL mission operations
could focus on the two Voyager spacecraft, in the coming decade there
will be an increasing number of planetary exploration spacecraft flying at
the same time. In addition to the Voyagers,. the Galileo and Magellan
spacecraft have been launched in the past year and are now on their way to
Jupiter and Venus, respectively. The Ulysses, CRAF (Comet Rendezvous
and Asteroid Flyby), Mars Observer, and other spacecraft will follow in
the next few years. To accommodate the increasing load on mission
operations, JPL has established a Space Flight Operations Center (SFOC) to
replace the individual mission control teams and spacecraft teams for
each mission. A single, multi-mission flight team will operate all of the
spacecraft. As more spacecraft are launched and begin to carry out their
missions, the Space Flight Operations Center will require significant
advances in automation technology in order to support the increasing
workload on operations personnel and to ensure the safety of the
spacecraft.
The Spacecraft Health Automated Reasoning Prototype (SHARP) was
developed as part of an on-going effort to apply artificial intelligence (AI)
techniques to mission operations automation. The primary task for an
operational SHARP system will be multi-mission monitoring and diagnosis
of spacecraft and ground systems in the Space Flight Operations Center.
As tools such as SHARP are developed, they are demonstrated and
evaluated in tough, operational settings to prove their performance. The
Voyager 2 spacecraft was targeted for the initial demonstration of the
SHARP system. The spacecraft's August 1989 encounter with the planet
Neptune afforded an excellent opportunity to evaluate SHARP in a rigorous
environment. The monitoring and troubleshooting of the
telecommunications subsystem on-board Voyager 2 and the process of
real-time telecommunications link analysis were selected as the initial
operations functions to be automated. Telecommunications with the
245
Voyager 2 spacecraft suffers from frequent anomalies and requires
coordination of monitoring and diagnosis efforts of both the spacecraft
and ground telecommunications systems. Due to cumbersome and time-
consuming manual processes and obsolete technology which will be
discussed in later paragraphs, severe limitations exist on the current
methods of analyzing Voyager telecommunications data. Even with the
substantial improvement in computing support which is part of the new
Space Flight Operations Center, the telecommunications area is both an
operations area sorely in need of automation as well as one of the most
challenging to automate.
3. TELECOMMUNICATIONS OPERATIONS
This section gives a brief overview of the telecommunications mission
operations process, specifically focusing on the monitoring of spacecraft
telecommunications subsystem health and telecommunications link status
operations. Two of the major challenges for automation are described:
The automation of manual data processing and data interpretation, and the
automated real-time anomaly detection and analysis.
As noted earlier, each spacecraft is monitored on a continuous basis. To
enable the receipt and collection of spacecraft engineering data, JPL
operates three complexes of antennas located around the world. These
complexes comprise NASA's Deep Space Network (DSN). With the
exception of occultations and a short gap between two of the stations
(Canberra and Madrid), a spacecraft is always in view from one of these
Deep Space Stations (DSS), as the complexes are called. A scheduled
observing period for a station is called a pass.
Three of the most important functions which are part of analysis of the
telecommunications link between the spacecraft, Deep Space Network, and
ground system computers at JPL are, 1) the numerical estimation of
telecommunications subsystem and link performance, 2) the monitoring of
real-time telecommunications activity and detection of failures or
degraded performance, and 3) the diagnosis, isolation, and recovery from
these problems. To accomplish each of these functions, a wide variety of
information must be accessed and processed manually by an operator.
Predictions of telecommunications performance are embodied in a type of
data known as "Predicts". Predicts are precise, numerical estimations of
expected engineering data values for particular spacecraft and Deep Space
Station parameters that impact the performance of the
telecommunications link, such as signal-to-noise ratio and antenna
elevation. Predicts are generated for each spacecraft pass over each
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groundstationand can be divided into four categories: raw predictions,
pass predictions, instantaneouspredictions,and residual calculations.
Whilethe detailsof Predictgenerationand analysisare beyondthe scope
of this paper,it can be notedthat muchof the Predictcalculationprocess
is performedmanually,and is tedious,time-consuming,incomplete,and
error-prone. Telecommunicationsoperatorsmay spend up to two hours
each day computing Predicts by hand using hardcopied listings of
spacecraftactivity, raw predictions,and pocket calculators. The SHARP
system completely automatesthe process of Predict generation and
analysis,savingup to two hoursof operatortimeeachday.
In additionto Predicts,telecommunicationsoperatorsuse the "Integrated
Sequenceof Events" (ISOE) to aid in monitoringtelecommunications
activity. The ISOEis a hardcopylistingof scheduledspacecraftand Deep
SpaceNetworkactivity. Operatorsuse the ISOE in Predictcalculations,
alarmdetermination,and anomalydiagnosis. The operatorsmustvisually
scan the ISOEto highlightrelevanttelecommunicationsinformation. This
processis prone to error duringperiodsof high spacecraftactivity and
when operators unknowingly do not reference the latest activity
modificationsto the ISOE. The SHARPsystemmaintainsa current,on-line
database of ISOE information and automatically provides relevant
telecommunicationactivity informationfrom the ISOE to the system's
other real-timemonitoringprocessesandthe operatoras needed.
The monitoring of telecommunicationsand detection of anomalies is
further complicatedby the selectionof alarm limits for spacecraftand
Deep Space Stationengineeringparameters. Unlike the Predictvalues
which are precise numerical predictions arising from a quantitative
simulation of spacecraft performance,the engineeringalarm limits are
critical thresholds which define the acceptable range of engineering
valueson any telemetrychannel. Excursionsbeyondthe alarmlimit range
indicate imminent failure situations. In current Voyager spacecraft
operations, alarm limits are determined manually according to the
informationin the ISOE, design informationabout spacecraftsubsystem
performance,and "rules of thumb" arising from the spacecraftteam's
experiencewith actualsubsystemperformanceover the life of a mission.
The currentmanualprocedureto changealarmlimits is so impeditivethat
for manyengineeringdata channelstypicallya wide thresholdis selected
that incorporates the entire range of parameter conditions, thereby
creatinga risk of undetectedanomalies. (See Doyle1 for a discussionof
problemsin the determinationof alarmlimits).
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In telecommunicationsas in otherareas,the ultimatediagnosis,isolation,
and recoveryfrom failures, anomalousconditions,or degradedsystem
performanceoften requiresthe interventionof expertswho have yearsof
specializedexperience operating spacecraft subsystems(e.g., power,
thermal,telecommunications).Oneof the mostserious limitationson the
currentmethodof missionoperationsare the critical flight skills built up
by these experts over the many years of flying spacecraft. These
specialistsmust be on-callat any time, and are frequentlyconsultedon a
daily basis. The timelinessof an expert responseto a problemcan be
critical in saving a spacecraft. Furthermore,when the experts retire,
their critical skills are lost to mission operations. The Voyager 2
spacecrafthasalreadybeenflying for almost13 years,and is expectedto
operateuntil 2018. Manyfuturespacecraftare expectedto have similar
longevity. The accumulatedexpertiseof missionoperationspersonnelis a
critical resourcewhichshouldbe preserved,and not recreatedevery time
a seniorengineerleavesthe flight project.
4. DESCRIPTION OF THE SHARP SYSTEM
The SHARP system applies artificial intelligence as well as conventional
computer science techniques to automate and eliminate much of the
tedious data processing and analysis associated with the monitoring of
spacecraft and ground system health and status. Many of the manual,
labor-intensive and error prone activities are eliminated in part or whole
by .SHARP. Some of these were described in the previous section. The
major automated functions provided by the SHARP system include:
• Real-time anomaly detection and diagnosis;
• Visualization of channelized data and system status;
• Acquisition and centralization of engineering data in a single
workstation;
• Real-time analysis of spacecraft performance predictions;
• Integration with specialized numerical analysis software, e.g.,
Fast Fourier Transforms for determining spacecraft antenna pointing
accuracy.
Figure 1 illustrates a top-level view of the SHARP system. Shown are the
individual modules that comprise the system, as well as relevant
components that are external to the Voyager application of SHARP. SHARP
is implemented in Common LISP on a Symbolics 3650 color LISP Machine.
The system is currently being ported to a Sun workstation, also running
Common LISP. SHARP relies extensively on an expert system building
language called STAR*TOOL, developed at JPL 2. The remainder of this
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Figure 1. SHARP Telecom System Overview
paper will focus on the first of these automated functions: real-time
anomaly detection and diagnosis. The remaining SHARP functions are
described elsewhere 3.
In SHARP, the automation of fault detection and diagnosis is accomplished
through the use of artificial intelligence programming techniques.
Artificial intelligence techniques are distributed throughout all
components of the SHARP system. Artificial intelligence programming
methodologies have enabled more effective automation and thorough
analysis for SHARP functions. Unlike the current manual methods used in
space flight operations, fault detection and diagnosis in SHARP is
extremely fast, taking approximately 1/200th of a second from receipt of
anomalous data to determination of a diagnosis. This speed is directly
attributable to the AI techniques incorporated by the design of the system.
Some of the techniques used in the SHARP system include: Procedural
reasoning, blackboards, reasoning using context trees, heuristic adaptive
parsing, and spontaneous computation daemons. Figure 2 illustrates the
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design of the "AI Module" in SHARP, which is responsible for fault
detection and diagnosis.
4.1 Alarm determination
The first step in verifying nominal spacecraft performance is to
determine whether received engineering data values are within acceptable
limits. Data which is outside limits is considered in alarm, and must be
explained. Data values can be classified as nominal, in "soft alarm"
(possibly indicating a warning condition), and in "hard alarm" (possibly
indicating an imminent failure condition). SHARP makes this
determination automatically, by selecting the appropriate alarm limits
for each channel of data and comparing new data against those limits in
real-time.
The SHARP module responsible for this function is the Alarm Executive, as
shown in Figure 2. The Alarm Executive module has a predetermined model
of spacecraft states and transitions between those states. The Voyager
application of SHARP has 39 such states. Alarm limits on each
engineering data channel are determined in advance by the domain expert
for each one of these spacecraft states. The limits are represented in
table format, and organized hierarchically into a discrimination network 7
layers deep (the network is ultimately compiled into a a very efficient
internal representation).
When a new engineering datum is received, the Alarm Executive first
scans the Integrated Sequence of Events (ISOE) for the major activities
and specialized activities which determine the spacecraft's current state,
and further confirms the state by checking real-time engineering data
related to spacecraft configuration. These are the keys used to search the
spacecraft state discrimination network. In the case of the Voyager
application of SHARP, the automatic gain control lock is checked to see if
it is synchronized. The correct table of alarm limits is retrieved and the
datum is matched against the appropriate alarm limits within the table
after any additional conditions are checked, such as operator overrides. In
general, more than a simple comparison of the datum against minimum and
maximum threshold values is possible in determining an alarm condition.
For example, an arbitrary function can be invoked to determine whether an
alarm condition exists. These functions can break down the engineering
datum into its individual bit status for example, or look at derivative
information for trend detection.
In some cases, an anomalous spacecraft condition is directly indicated,
e.g., based on error codes in the engineering data. In most cases, however,
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Figure 2. SHARP Artificial Intelligence Module
further analysis is required in order to determine the nature of the
problem. The Alarm Executive makes this decision, and in addition
monitors, logs, and reports to the telecommunications operator a number
of attributes of the alarm situation, including the severity of alarm
changes (i.e., from soft to hard alarm), the previous alarm status of the
channel, and whether the operator has acknowledged the previous alarm
messages. A variety of user interface and display changes are triggered
by the Alarm Executive. If further analysis is required, the Alarm
Executive informs the Fault Classifier module in SHARP. Analysis of
alarm conditions by the Alarm Executive and Fault Classifier modules can
proceed in parallel for any number of detected alarms.
4.2 Fault Classification
The Fault Classification module is a rule-based system which makes an
initial interpretation of alarm conditions, spacecraft state, and the
sources of engineering data indicating the anomaly. The result of the
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
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interpretationis a rough classificationof the type of problem or its
possible location in the telecommunicationssystem, e.g., is it a
spacecraftreceiverproblem,a possibleconfigurationmismatchbetween
the ground and spacecrafttelecommunicationsubsystems,and so on.
Frequently, there is no unambiguous interpretation available and
subsequentdiagnosis must proceed in parallel with several conflicting
hypotheses. The productsof the fault classificationare assertedinto a
databasewhich results in a pattern-directedinvocation of specialized
diagnostic routines, called "Mini-experts", described below. This
architecture of hierarchical invocation of specialized diagnostic
knowledge is related to the paradigm of cooperating specialists in
classificatory diagnosis embodied in the CSRL system4 and in the
StarPlansystem5.
4.3 Mini-expert diagnostic routines
The Voyager telecommunications application of SHARP includes
approximately 40 mini-experts. These specialized diagnostic routines are
each responsible for the local diagnosis of a specific fault or class of
faults, such as particular channels in alarm, conical scan errors,
configuration mismatches, or loss of telemetry. Mini-experts can be
either cooperating or non-cooperating. A non-cooperating mini-expert
focuses only on its designated fault area, and generally its conclusions
can and should be reported independently to the operator. A cooperating
mini-expert has the additional capability of searching beyond its local
area to identify related faults that are likely to occur. In the process of
this search, the cooperating mini-expert triggers other mini-experts who
are specialists in those related areas. Information is exchanged between
the mini-experts using a blackboard message system.
Mini-experts encode a procedural network of diagnostic decisions and
analyses. They are related to rules in the Procedural Reasoning System
(PRS) of Georgeff and Lansky 6, although the representation mini-expert
procedures differs. Mini-expert rule definitions include high-level
descriptions of preconditions, activation and execution contexts,
spacecraft state descriptions, relevant real-time data sources,
hypotheses, and sequences of analyses and decisions which are part of the
diagnostic process. Mini-expert knowledge definitions are not interpreted
by SHARP. Instead, SHARP contains a compiler which generates Common
LISP code from mini-expert descriptions and automatically installs the
definitions into the SHARP run-time environment. The compiler performs
the necessary bookkeeping and also checks for consistency with the other,
installed mini-experts. Currently, a trained knowledge engineer must
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develop mini-expert definitions by hand, and this constitutes a bottleneck
for application of the system. To aid in knowledge acquisition, we are
developing a graphical interface, called a "visual rule-building system"
which can be used by domain experts to create mini-experts which would
then be directly compiled by SHARP as before.
As mentioned above, the Fault Classification module may not determine a
unique mini-expert to invoke. In this case, multiple mini-experts are
invoked which pursue diagnoses in pseudo-parallel. Pseudo-parallelism is
implement in SHARP using facilities provided by STAR*TOOL, which
includes parallelism as a fundamental control structure. The various
mini-experts and their rules operate in isolation of one another by
executing in independent contexts 7 provided in the STAR*TOOL memory
model. Contexts can be organized into a tree-like structure to represent
contradictory information resulting from changes in facts or from the
introduction of new or contradictory hypotheses.
4.4 Hypothesis Combination
The Hypothesis Combiner module has the role of combining multiple fault
hypotheses generated when several mini-experts are invoked in parallel by
the Fault Classification module. The module communicates with mini-
experts through SHARP's blackboard. Related fault hypotheses are
combined into a single, more encompassing explanation for the operator
(e.g., when there is a single action to take in response). Redundant
hypotheses are eliminated in the process as well. When there are
conflicting explanations for a detected problem, SHARP presents all of
the explanations to the operator along with the separate recovery
recommendations. In some cases, the operator is privy to information and
knowledge which SHARP does not have, and can effectively disambiguate
the situation. In any event, the final problem determination step and any
corrective actions is left to the operator in cases of ambiguity.
5. VOYAGER ENCOUNTER WITH NEPTUNE EVALUATION
Approximately one month before the Voyager encounter with the planet
Neptune, a Symbolics workstation with SHARP loaded on it was moved
from the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at JPL into the real-time
telecommunications operations area for the Voyager spacecraft. There
were severe restrictions on how SHARP could interact with other Voyager
systems. To simplify the installation, SHARP obtained spacecraft
engineering data from the Voyager Test and Telemetry System over a
printer port. Unabridged Integrated Sequence of Events and raw Predict
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data were loaded into SHARP using tapes, rather than through network
connections as in the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory.
During the demonstration period, SHARP helped find the cause of a Voyager
science data error anomaly which appeared in the telemetry from the
spacecraft as an excess error count. The SHARP system's graphical
displays were used by telecommunications personnel to identify the
problem and to characterize its magnitude. The problem was isolated
using SHARP and other, manual trouble-shooting techniques to the Voyager
ground data system and was corrected by the replacement of a wide-band
interface unit in the Voyager Data Acquisition and Capture System (DACS).
SHARP helped verify that the replacement of the unit actually fixed the
problem. In a matter of hours, SHARP was able to assist operators in
solving an anomalous condition which could have easily escalated to a
more serious problem during the encounter itself, and could have taken
human operators days or weeks to isolate without SHARP.
Also during the demonstration period, the knowledge engineer of SHARP
and the domain expert would review alarms that SHARP had given.
Generally, these alarms were correct. In one alarm situation, SHARP was
giving warnings about the loss of the telecommunications signal. This
ultimately turned out to be a false alarm as the spacecraft was
undertaking a particular maneuver that the SHARP knowledge base did not
contain, thereby leading the diagnostic system into an erroneous
conclusion about antenna pointing. In other cases, SHARP was able to
detect conditions where the Deep Space Station antenna tracking the
spacecraft was drifting off point. SHARP detected these problems in a
matter of seconds, and reported the condition to the telecommunications
operators. Unfortunately, due to their previous lack of ability to detect
and diagnose antenna pointing problems, the real-time
telecommunications operators at JPL did not have procedures for alerting
the Deep Space Station operators (possibly on the other side of the world)
to antenna drift situations detected by SHARP. When the antenna drift
reached a sufficient magnitude and urgency for the station operators to
notice and correct, SHARP was able to detect the resolution of the
problem and cancel the alarm situation. SHARP detected and correctly
diagnosed other non-critical problems with the receiver automatic gain
control and the S-band travelling wave tube temperature on board the
spacecraft.
On the whole, the encounter with Neptune went extremely smoothly for
the Voyager spacecraft. SHARP did not get a chance to make any really
dramatic diagnoses, and the diagnostic system described in this paper did
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not get a strenuousoperationaltest. This underscores the difficulty in
testing the diagnostic ability of real-time monitoring and control expert
systems in operation settings: you may not get any problems! Using
simulated data (based on historical problems with the spacecraft and
based on synthetic situations) we were able to test SHARP much more
thoroughly in the laboratory. SHARP is able to analyze 39 classes of
telecommunications problems, and make about 60 unique diagnoses which
require some problem-solving by the mini-experts to determine. Another
20 telecommunications problems are detectable by SHARP, but can be
reported directly to the operator. Our domain expert estimates that
SHARP covers approximately 80% of the known types of faults experienced
in spacecraft telecommunications for Voyager. The remaining 20% include
diagnoses which could be made if SHARP had the appropriate real-time
data and additional knowledge engineering. As with most complex
systems, there is always the possibility of novel faults. SHARP does not
have the ability to successfully diagnose and explain a novel type of fault
(nor was it intended to), but we are confident in the system's ability to
detect departures from expected, nominal behavior.
6. EXPECTED BENEFITS FROM SHARP APPLICATIONS
There are four principle areas where the JPL telecommunications users of
SHARP expect to see benefits from application of the system and its
descendents, which we are now developing. These areas are safety,
workforce savings, reliability, and productivity.
Through its accurate detection, analysis, and tracking of the antenna drift
and pointing conditions during the encounter, SHARP showed that it can
detect and analyze important problems in a matter of seconds which
currently take human operators minutes or hours. This provides an extra
margin for ensuring the safety of the spacecraft, and thereby supports the
success of the mission as a whole. The SHARP Voyager
telecommunications domain expert, a man with over 20 years of
experience who has cognizance not only for Voyager telecommunications
operations but for other spacecraft as well, as stated publicly that the
Soviets would not have lost the first Phobos spacecraft if they had SHARP
applied to their telecommunications. One of the stated causes of the loss
of the Phobos spacecraft has been that the spacecraft antenna drifted
until the telecommunications link was lost due to a faulty attitude
control command.
A second major benefit from application of SHARP will be in the area of
workforce savings. Through its automation of many manual functions,
SHARP promises to reduce the real-time link analysis operations staff by
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a factor of five, and there is reason to believe that similar savings may be
possible in other operations areas. This is precisely the type of benefit
from automation which is necessary to support the single multi-mission
flight team in the new JPL Space Flight Operations Center.
The system-wide status monitoring afforded by SHARP, and not discussed
in detail in this paper, helps operators assure correct telecommunications
system configuration. This is expected to reduced the number of
commanding errors to the spacecraft and ground systems, and thereby
reduce the loss or corruption of data due to configuration problems.
Finally, the SHARP system is expected to enhance the productivity of
operations personnel by freeing them from the tedium of watching raw
data and interpreting it for themselves. SHARP shifts the burden of
routine monitoring operations, and most of the boring, manual
computations which are involved, away from the operator to itself. This
will enable operations personnel to perform required analyses more
efficiently, and to exert a higher level of "supervisory monitoring" over
multiple spacecraft subsystems on multiple spacecraft.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Spacecraft and ground data systems operations present a rigorous
environment in the area of monitoring and anomaly detection and
diagnosis. With a number of planetary missions scheduled for the near
future, the effort to staff and support these operations will present
significant challenges.
The SHARP system was developed to address the challenges of automation
in a multi-mission operations environment by augmenting conventional
automation technologies with artificial intelligence. Its successful
development and demonstration have led to a number of important
conclusions. First and foremost, artificial intelligence technology is
ready for application to spaceflight operations. The techniques can be
used alongside conventional computer science techniques, and diagnostic
knowledge-based systems can be embedded in the resulting application
system. Acceptable real-time performance can be achieved. SHARP was
never pushed to the limit of its speed or memory resources; in fact, most
of its time was spent idle, waiting for new engineering data to process.
This gives us confidence for broadening the approach in SHARP to multiple
spacecraft subsystems.
The evaluation by Voyager personnel also taught us that the types of
automation provided by SHARP are high desired by operations personnel,
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and are not viewed as job-threatening (although they may be in some
cases). Operators were able to readily use the system with minimal
training, and were enthusiastic about using the wide variety of graphical
displays and options.
SHARP is now being extended and developed to a higher level of readiness
so that flight projects such as Voyager, Magellan, Galileo, and others can
use it directly. The system will be completed in 1990 and delivered to the
Space Flight Operations Center for further evaluation and application to
Magellan telecommunications. Separately, SHARP is also being applied to
the Deep Space Network, Network Operations Control Center at JPL, with
an operational system planned for 1991. Applications for remote
monitoring and control of spaceborne instruments and experiments are
also under consideration.
8. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The research described in this publication was carried out by the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, under a contract
with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The authors
wish to acknowledge Denise Lawson and Harry Porta for their
contributions to SHARP development, and to Boyd Madsen for providing
expert knowledge for Voyager telecommunications. Portions of this work
have been reported previously while in progress at the 1989 Goddard
Conference on Space Applications of Artificial Intelligence, Greenbelt,
Maryland, May 16-17.
9. REFERENCES
1. Doyle, R., Sellers, S., and Atkinson, D., "Enhancing Aerospace System
Autonomy Through Predictive Monitoring", Proceedings of AIAA Meeting on
Aerospace Sciences, American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics,
Reno, Nevada, 1989.
2. James, Mark, and Atkinson, David, "STAR*TOOL -- An Environment and
Language for Expert System Implementation", Jet Propulsion Laboratory
Report NTR C-17536, August, 1988.
3. Lawson, D., and James, M., "SHARP: A Multi-Mission Artificial
Intelligence System for Spacecraft Telemetry Monitoring and Diagnosis",
1989 Goddard Conference on Space Applications of Artificial Intelligence,
pp. 185-200, NASA, Greenbelt, Maryland, 1989. Also Jet Propulsion
Laboratory Publication 89-23, May, 1989.
257
4. Chandrasekaran, B., "Distributed Knowledge-based Systems for
Diagnosis and Information Retrieval", Department of Computer and
Information Sciences Report 763180/714659, November, 1983.
5. Siemens, R.W., Golden, M., and Ferguson, J., "StarPlan I1: Evolution of an
Expert System", Proceedings of the Fifth National Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, American Association for Artificial Intelligence,
Philadelphia, PA, 1986.
6. Georgeff, M., and Lansky, A., "A System for Reasoning in Dynamic
Domains: Fault Diagnosis on the Space Shuttle", Technical Note 375,
Artificial Intelligence Center, SRI International, January, 1986.
7. McDermott, D. V., "Very Large PLANNER-type data bases", Memo AIM-
339, AI Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1975.
258
